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Ian Gough
Thatcherism
and the Welfare State
Britain is experiencing the most far-reaching
experiment in 'new right' politics in the western world.
'Minister, how exactly will shutting down old peoples'
homes revitalise the British economy?'
(Robin Day in a radio interview with a Conservative government
minister)
The British welfare state is under attack today, that much is clear. But
why? What is the nature of the attack? How does the 'new
conservatism' of the Thatcher government differ from the 'traditional
Toryism' of Macmillan and Heath? What is the link between the
Government's monetarist economic policies and their and-welfarism?
And will either work ? These are some of the questions I want briefly to
tackle here.
The cuts
The current crisis in the welfare state has a quantitative and a
qualitative dimension. Let us look at each in turn. Since the mid-
1970s first a Labour then a Tory government have successfully
attempted to restrain the previously rapid growth of expenditure on
the major social services (see table). Between 1975/6 and 1977/8 the
Labour government cut back housing and education spending, held
spending on personal social services constant and thereby stabilised
total social expenditure. The newly instituted cash limit system
clearly did its work, especially in cutting back these local authority
provided services.
A slight easing of controls on social spending occurred in the last
year of the Labour government permitting an increase of 2% overall
(after allowing for the switch from child tax allowances to child benefit
Social Expenditure in the UK: % increases at constant 1979 prices
Social security
National health service
Personal social services
Education
Housing
Total social services
Total public expenditure
1975/6
-77/8
(2 years)
8.3
2.0
0.4
-4.0
-12.4
0.6
-6.5
1977/8
-78/9
9.7(3.6)*
2.6
3.7
2.2
-5.1
4.5(1.8)
6.0(4.5)
1978/9
-79/80
3.6(-0.7)*
0.0
3.3
1.4
2.2
2.2(0.4)
4.1(3.1)
Planned
1979/80
-80/1
2.4
2.7
-6.6
-4.5
-12.5
-1.2
-0.7
Planned
1980/1
-82/3
(2 years)
0.7
2.1
3.9
-4.1
-30.9
-3.4
-3.8
Source: Public Expenditure White Paper Cmnd 7841, March 1980.
*The social security figures for 1978/9 and 1979/80 are spuriously inflated due to the
switch from a combination of family allowances and child tax allowances to child benefit.
The figures in brackets in these columns are a rough attempt to exclude the impact of this
change.
- a quite spurious 'increase' in social security outlays). Planned
spending for the next year (1979/80) allowed for virtually no growth
and marked a switch in the target of cuts from the locally provided
services to the centrally provided social security and health system.
Though the Tories' June 1979 Budget made further immediate cuts in
the housing and education programme, raised prescription charges
and cut back on employment services for that year, the plans for this
next squeeze on social spending had already been decided on by the
outgoing Labour government.
Then in November 1979 and March 1980 the Thatcher government
took two more swings of the axe against the welfare state and
determined a real fall in its resources for 1980/81. Once again housing,
education and the personal social services are the prime targets,
though social security is further squeezed. Even more far-reaching
cuts are planned for the next two years. Of course the immediate
impact on many services is often worse than the crude averages
suggest. For example the growing number of elderly people in the
population means that personal services such as home helps need to
rise by 2% each year just to keep pace. So even a standstill on
expenditure results in a sharp fall in the quality of many social
services. Furthermore the planned cuts for this year assume an
inflation rate of }6Vz% which is an obvious underestimate. If the
Government sticks to its cash limits the real impact on services will be
much worse than the table suggests.
The Conservatives' intention progressively to reduce resources for
the social services marks a new approach: previous expenditure plans
by the Labour government anticipated a further growth after the
'temporary' cuts which were necessitated by the economic crisis.
Nevertheless it is important to stress that this quantitative attack on
the welfare state was initiated by the Wilson/Callaghan administra-
tions in 1975: the Conservative policy is simply more (or rather less) of
the same. In turning to the qualitative shifts in policy we see more
clearly the distinctive ideological reversal championed by the
Thatcher administration.
The ideological attack
Its policy changes include the following. Sitting council house tenants
have the right to buy their house at very large discounts, council rents
are going up sharply (which will further 'encourage' the sale of council
houses), new housing programmes are pared to the bone and new
controls are to be introduced over councils' direct works departments.
In education the trend to comprehensives will be halted, overseas
student fees will be linked to their full economic cost and the new
assisted places scheme will provide more public money for private
schools. And in social security the recent Budget marks the most
important attack on social rights since the war: benefits to strikers'
families are cut by £12 a week, 'short-term' benefits for the sick,
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unemployed and disabled are deliberately cut by raising them only
11 V2% this year and by taxing them in subsequent years, increases in
child benefits are postponed, and earnings-related short-term benefits
will be abolished (but not earnings-related contributions). Even state
pensioners will suffer a fall in real income since the rise of 161/2% will
undoubtedly fall short of price increases.
Drawing together the threads of these policies, we see a major
attempt to reprivatise parts of the welfare state (housing, education),
higher charges on consumers (health, housing), and in social security
explicit decisions to weaken the organised working class, to widen the
gap between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' claimants and to
encourage work incentives (at the same time that some employment
schemes are eliminated and unemployment will escalate). This is not
to mention the encouragement of police and law and order services, or
the overt attack on progressive education. It is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the welfare state is attacked by the new conservatism
at least as much for ideological as for economic reasons. Some of their
policies (the assisted places scheme, possibly council house sales) will
raise net costs to the Exchequer.
RESTRUCTURING THE WELFARE STATE UNDER
THATCHER
In The Political Economy of the Welfare State^ I argued:
There are four ways amongst others in which the state, acting in the
long-term interests of capital, may seek to restructure the welfare state at a
time of economic crisis like the present: by adapting policies to secure
more efficient reproduction of the labour force, by shifting emphasis to the
social control of destabilising groups in society, by raising productivity
within the social services and possibly by reprivatising parts of the welfare
state.'
However I also argued that this process of restructuring needs to be
situated within an overall strategy for counteracting the crisis, and
that there were, in Britain today, two alternative capitalist strategies
available: the radical right strategy and the 'corporatist' strategy. The
Labour administrations of 1974-79 practised a degenerated form of
is attacked by the new Conservatism at
least as much for ideological as for
economic reasons.
corporatism increasingly watered down with various monetarist
elements. In the 1979 election a clear choice was expressed (at least in
the southern half of England) for an undiluted form of the right wing
strategy. But what are the crucial elements of the 'new conservatism'
and how have they affected the restructuring of the welfare state?
In answering this question I am drawing on some previous articles
in Marxism Today. Peter Leonard2 has explored different ways in
which this restructuring takes place under social democracy and
under the 'radical right'. Together with earlier articles by Stuart Hall3
and Andrew Gamble,4 he emphasises the specific role of political and
ideological elements in this particular response to the contemporary
crisis of British capitalism. I wish to consider the links between these
and the Tories' economic strategy analysed by Michael Bleaney.5
According to Hall and Gamble, Thatcherism is a political formation
that combines the principles of the 'social market economy' with a
new 'authoritarian populism'. The social market economy represents
a return to some of the precepts of nineteenth century liberalism; a
limited role for government, an emphasis on the responsibilities of the
individual and so forth. In Britain and the Anglo-Saxon world
generally this has taken the form of a resurgence of monetarism as
advocated by Milton Friedman. Populism represents an appeal to
national interests which are supposedly above class interests, drawing
on the ideology of a neutral market place working in the interests of
all. In its attack on immigrants, welfare recipients and unions, for
example, it stresses the need for a strong state to represent national
over sectional interests, though Thatcherism clearly differs from a
this new right ideology did not appear
out of thin air
truly authoritarian movement. Crudely speaking then Thatcherism =
monetarism + authoritarian populism, though the two threads of this
ideology clearly complement each other.
The centrality of the welfare state
What is striking for our purposes is the position of the welfare state at
the heart of these two strands. The welfare state is the central target
for the radical right on both counts. First, because it allegedly
generates even higher tax levels, budget deficits, disincentives to work
and save, and a bloated class of unproductive workers. Second,
because it encourages 'soft' attitudes towards crime, immigrants, the
idle, the feckless, strikers, the sexually aberrant and so forth.
Economic prescriptions and populist incantations are harnessed
together, and their prime target is the expanded sphere of state
responsibility, state regulation and state-provided benefits which
constitute the modern welfare state. As Hall stresses, this new right
ideology did not appear out of thin air; it needed to be constructed,
though it utilised existing elements. And, as Gamble shows, it had to
be welded into a party political programme which could be electorally
successful.
The process of restructuring the welfare state can now be situated
within the political formation of the radical right. First, the
quantitative role of cuts follows from the precepts of monetarism: strict
control of the money supply, a substantial reduction in the level of
government expenditure and taxation and a shift towards indirect
taxation. A reduction in the public sector borrowing requirement is a
key object of policy because of its impact on the money supply (or on
interest rates if government securities are to be sold to the non-
banking sector). Given the commitment to lower tax levels in order to
encourage incentives to work and invest, this must involve even faster
cuts in public spending. Given the commitment to higher defence
spending, this must involve still greater cuts in social and economic
expenditures. This has as another aim the weakening of the power of
organised labour via higher rates of unemployment (and the threat of
still higher levels if wage claims are 'excessive'). The goal is to use
market forces (together with new legal restrictions) to reduce real
wages and augment profits. A cut in the 'social wage', for example
reducing housing subsidies or personal social services, augments this
pressure to reduce labour's share in the national income. It thus
provides an indirect route to encourage profitability and re-
investment in British industry, even if a sound monetarist
government like the present one disclaims any responsibility for the
national rate of economic growth.
Second, the qualitative shifts in social policy are designed to re-
assert individualism, self-reliance and family responsibility, and to
reverse the collective social provision of the post-war era. Present
attempts to impose a national curriculum and 'raise standards' in
public education provide a striking example of the social programme
of the new conservatism. In many ways, though not all, these
qualitative shifts complement the absolute cuts in expenditure:
cutting social benefits to working age adults saves money and panders
to the anti-scrounger mentality of the new populism. Together these
two sets of forces have generated the most sustained attack on the
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welfare state since the war. The restructuring of the welfare state has
begun in earnest.
WELFARE UNDER CAPITALISM
To understand why the welfare state is under attack today, we must
first understand why it developed so markedly this century and in
particular since the Second World War. This section summarises the
analysis developed at greater length in my book. The welfare state in
modern capitalist countries comprises public cash benefits (such as
pensions), public benefits in kind (such as education), public
regulation of the activities of individuals and corporations (such as
consumer or labour legislation) and the taxation system. This complex
of measures serves two major goals: the reproduction of labour-
power, and the maintenance and control of the non-working
population. Both involve quantitative and qualitative aspects; the
state ensures directly or indirectly a minimum level of consumption
for different groups in the population, and at the same time it modifies
the pattern of socialisation, behaviour and abilities within the
population. Since it is a capitalist welfare state it imposes sanctions
and controls at the same time that it provides benefits (take council
housing, for example, or education or supplementary benefit).
These goals can be grouped together and constitute the state
organisation of social reproduction. As Engels pointed out, reproduction
is just as essential an activity in all societies as production. The process
of social reproduction refers to the processes of biological
reproduction, of economic consumpton and of socialisation: in short
to the way individuals as social beings are 'produced' rather than
goods and services in the process of production. Of course the family
has played, and continues to play, a crucial function here, but when
we refer to the state organisation of social reproduction we are
referring to the way the welfare state has modified and partially
supplemented the family in the twentieth century. From supple-
mentary benefit to child care officers the welfare state today is
intimately involved in this process. But our definition also reminds us
how contentious this process is: after all the radical right are
questioning precisely the respective roles of state, family and market
in the sphere of social reproduction.
Reproduction is only one of the activities of the modern capitalist
state. Modifying James O'Connor's analysis in his book The Fiscal
Crisis of the State6 we can identify three broad functions that it
performs:
1. accumulation
2. reproduction
3. legitimation/repression
The first refers to all the means by which the state tries to maintain
favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital. The third refers
to the means by which it attempts to maintain social order and social
control whilst at the same time trying to preserve social harmony and
avoid harmful conflict (harmful, that is, to the state and private
capital). Social policies clearly have implications for these other goals
of the modern state: for example some policies (like the redundancy
payments scheme or parts of higher education) are designed to achieve
economic benefits for the private sector; whilst others (such as some
aspects of education) perform a social control job, and many help to
legitimise the system and reduce dissension in society. So the welfare
state is involved in all three areas of activity, though I would argue its
prime concern is with maintaining and adapting social reproduction.
The welfare state: the outcome of conflict
But this does no more than provide a framework for understanding
particular social policies such as those of the Thatcher government. In
fact it scarcely does this, for there is a danger in the above account of
explaining the modern welfare state in terms of the functions that it
performs in capitalist society — the danger, in short, of a crudely
functionalist account. But class conflict, in particular pressure from
the organised working class, has played a major role in the origins and
spread of welfare services. Indeed for many the British welfare state is
the child of the labour movement and the post-war Labour
government. How can this be reconciled with the role that, we have
argued, it plays in securing capital accumulation, social reproduction
and political legitimation?
The brief answer is that the welfare state is the vector of two sets of
political forces: 'pressure from below' and 'reform from above'. The
first refers to the myriad ways in which class movements together with
social and community movements demand social reforms to protect or
extend their interests. This may result from pressure group politics
within the state at one extreme to direct action and street conflict at
the other. 'Reform from above' refers to the various ways in which the
state seeks to implement social reform which will serve the longer-
term economic, social and political interests of capital, or particualar
sections of capital. The state does not automatically perform this job:
it requires at the least the executive and administrative wherewithal!
and a form of political mobilisation. I believe these are more readily
available the more centralised is the apparatus of the state. The
stronger is the role of the executive and senior civil service vis-a-vis
parliament, for example, the more can they override short-term
pressures from representative's of particular capitalist interests and
impose a longer-term, more class-oriented strategy.
I would argue that these two sets offerees have both strengthened,
'I Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, Macmillan, 1979.
2P Leonard, 'Restructuring the Welfare State: from social democracy to the
radical right', Marxism Today, Dec 1979.
3S Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', Marxism Today, Jan 1979.
4A Gamble, 'The Decline of the Conservative Party', Marxism Today, Nov
1979.
5M Bleaney, 'The Tories' economic stratgy', Marxism Today, Nov 1979.
6J O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St James Press, 1973.
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and partially reinforced one another, over the last 40 years particularly
in Britain. Their interaction led to two especially notable periods of
social reform in the 1940s and the 1960s. During the Second World
War the foundations of the Keynesian-welfare state were established.
Though many of the reforms were enacted by the post-war Attlee
government, it is notable that most were the product of the war-time
coalition government (the Beveridge report, the Butler Education
Act). They represented the outcome of pressures from below -
war-time radicalisation and a spirit of 'no going back to the Thirties'
- plus reforming drives from above — a recognition of the political
and economic necessity of greater state responsibility for economic
performance, notably through Keynesian demand management tech-
niques. Thus in Britain Keynes and Beveridge represented a linked
response to the pre-war crisis focusing respectively on demand
management (part, but only part, of the economic sphere) and the
sphere of social reproduction. Together they formed the core of the
'post-war settlement' between capital and labour which was to prove
so successful a basis for post-war prosperity.
The 60s and 70s
The 1960s and early 1970s saw a second wave of reforms as social and
economic policy was slowly restructured in the face of a faltering rate
of accumulation in Britain. The development of incomes policies,
industrial strategies, the modification of Beveridge's social security
principles, the expansion of higher education: all these represented a
further extension of state intervention and a closer gearing of
economic and social policy. Again there were pressures from below,
from a labour movement of greater defensive economic strength, and
from newer social and community movements; and pressures from
above as reformers and spokesmen for capital understood the limited
role of Keynesian policies and advocated more systematic economic
and social intervention in order to restructure British capital in the
face of overseas competition, domestic class pressures and a falling
rate of profit. Again, though the Labour election victory in 1964
signalled the shift in direction, many of the individual reforms had
been initiated in the last years of the previous Conservative
administration.
So the British welfare state represents the outcome of growing
working class pressure for economic and social reforms, modified by
the desire of a more centralised state apparatus to restructure
economic and social policies for its own reasons. In part the post-war
Keynesian-welfare state generated its own momentum for further
state intervention, to secure economic growth and capital accumula-
tion within a new balance of class forces that it had itself helped to
shape. It follows from this that the development of Keynesian
economic policy and modern social policy were interlinked and
formed the two central planks of the post-war political consensus
between the parties. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that both
planks are simultaneously under attack from the new radical right.
THE WELFARE STATE AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
But what, if any, is the link between an expanded welfare state and a
declining economy? Is the British economic crisis the result of an
overgrown public sector, as the present Government would have it, or
are the two unconnected? My own view is that there is a link, but that
it is not so straightforward or unambiguous as the new conservatism
suggests. After all a recent EEC report showed that government
spending as a share of GDP is lower in the UK than any other country
in the EEC. On the other hand socialist reformers and others who
deny any link and who reiterate Keynesian nostrums about the need
for more public spending in order to pull us out of recession do a
disservice to the socialist movement. The Keynesian welfare state has
it is likely that the British welfare system
has contributed to the crisis by
exacerbating inflation and undermining
market mechanisms.
generated new contradictions working as it is within the framework of
a private capitalist economy. It is not possible for state spending to rise
inexorably as a share of GNP without adverse consequences for its
domestic capital. What then are these limits?
In general the impact of the welfare state on capitalist economy will
depend on the answers to several questions, in particular the
following:
1. Who pays the taxes? In answering this we must recognise that both
capital and labour possess the means of trying to pass on higher
taxes — via higher prices or higher pre-tax wages.
2. On what criteria are social benefits distributed? Are they
predominantly distributed on some criterion of need, or do they
take into account the labour market position of men and women,
the impact on work incentives, and so forth? In other words do
social policies subvert or complement the mechanism of the market?
Generally speaking, the impact of welfare policies on capital
accumulation will be more favourable the more they are paid for by
taxes on labour rather than capital, the more they follow market
criteria in distributing and awarding benefits, and the more closely are
social and economic policies integrated. But of course the more social
policies are shifted in this direction, the more they may interfere with
social reproduction and political legitimation.
The impact on British capitalism
In the light of this what has been the impact of the welfare state on
British capitalism? Two peculiar facts about Britain must be borne in
mind in answering this question. First, the position of Britain within
the world economy is a declining one, and the deep-seated weaknesses
of our economic structure are now super-imposed on a world-wide
recession which has marked the end of the post-war boom. Second,
the defensive economic strength of the British trade union movement
has prevented the strategy of industrial restructuring attempted by
Labour and Conservative administrations since the early 1960s from
being successfully implemented (Purdy, Jacques).7 This defensively
strong, decentralised labour movement with extensive shop-floor
organisation has also hindered the restructuring of the welfare state.
Unlike the USA, Britain has a developed set of social services available
in the main for the whole population rather than certain privileged
strata within it. But unlike Sweden and West Germany for example
these are not closely integrated with economic policy to achieve
greater mobility of labour or to encourage labour force participation.
Council housing policy, for example, may well restrict the mobility of
labour demanded by capital and interfere with the operation of labour
markets. Furthermore British unions managed to maintain their
members' post-tax incomes in the face of slow growth, rising tax levels
and periodic incomes policies at least until the mid-1970s. But again
unlike Sweden this was not achieved by means of a corporatist-style
social contract which would yield some tangible benefits to capital. In
an environment of relative economic decline, it is likely that the
British welfare system has contributed to the British economic crisis
by exacerbating inflation and undermining market mechanisms. But
these very features stem from the particular ways social policy has
developed in post-war Britain, outlined above.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that monetarist and populist
attacks on the welfare state have established themselves here. Given
the failure of Keynesianism, and the progressive degeneration of the
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Labour governments' corporatist experiments after the 1974 Social
Contract, a vacuum opened up which first Powell, then Thatcher,
Joseph el al were quick to exploit. The defeat of the Left in the EEC
referendum of 1975 under a Labour government helped prepare the
ground for this move to the right. The indigenous populist ideology,
analysed by Hall and Gamble; the reluctance of British capital to opt
for Continental-style interventionism; and the failure of the Labour
leadership to develop an alternative strategy to replace the wilting
nostrums of Keynesianism, all left the way open for a tax-welfare
backlash culminating in the victory of the new conservatism in the last
election. The Left is also implicated in its failure to unify around some
coherent transitional strategy as an alternative to both Labour
reformism and the new conservatism. The alternative economic
strategy adopted at the Labour Party conference in 1973 represented
an important stage in this process of re-thinking. But as Hodgson8 has
argued it was conceived by the left of the Labour Party, in particular
the Tribune group, as a Parliamentary policy without the need for
mobilisation at the local level, which emasculated its socialist content
and meant that it differed little from corporatist-style
interventionism.
The result is that Britain is experiencing the most far-reaching
experiment in 'new right' politics in the Western world. The Thatcher
government alone has received Milton Friedman's blessing. Its
underlying aim is to attack the labour movement on the economic and
ideological fronts. The policy shifts outlined earlier on can all be seen
to contribute to this aim: legal sanctions against unions, mass
unemployment by means of tight monetary controls, the cutting of
social benefits for the families of strikers, a reduction in the social
wage on several fronts, and a shift to more authoritarian practices in
the welfare field. It represents one coherent strategy for managing the
British crisis, a strategy aimed at the heart of the post-war Keynesian-
welfare state settlement.
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THATCHERISM
Will it work? In trying to answer this question, I will address in turn
each of the three functions of the state mentioned earlier on.
1. Accumulation. All economic forecasters now agree that the
prospects for the British economy until at least 1983 are grim. The
Economist (Feb 2-8,1980) — by no means the most gloomy — predicts
by 1981 a fall of 2Vi% in GDP, manufacturing investment down by
121/2%, unemployment up to 2 million according to the Government's
downward-biased measure, inflation still well into double figures and
a current account deficit, North Sea oil notwithstanding, of £3 billion.
The Cambridge Economic Policy Group forecast is still more
pessimistic, predicting an 8% fall in real GDP from 1979-81. Thus the
deflationary monetarist policies of the present Government hardly
provide the basis for a recovery in profitability and capital
accumulation in the short to medium term: instead they are making
matters much worse.
The cuts in social expenditure will have an impact not only on the
recipients of the services, but on sections of private capital as well. So
far it is capital spending that has borne the brunt of the cuts, so that
government demand for the output of the construction industry for
example has fallen dramatically. The new cuts announced recently
will only exacerbate this problem. One half of NHS expenditure for
example consists of purchases from the private and nationalised
sectors (drugs, supplies, oil, electricity), so that government cuts here
directly harm private industry. Even if the Government manages to
impose its future cuts on transfer payments, public sector
employment and wage and salary levels, this will still have a multiplier
effect on private sector output. The Chancellor's intention to reduce
public sector borrowing sharply to £8Vi billion in 1980, only 33/4% of
GDP, will exacerbate the already deep recession.
How can it happen that a policy intentionally designed to revitalise
British capitalism should have this opposite effect? It stems from a
contradiction within the accumulation process long ago noted by
Marx. For capital accumulation to proceed two conditions must be
fulfilled: first, profits must be produced by successfully exploiting
labour within the production process; second, these profits must then
be realised by the exchange of commodities in the circulation process.
These two movements of the process are now in contradiction.
Keynesian policies by sustaining aggregate demand overcame the
inter-war crisis of underconsumption but have over the long-term
contributed to a falling rate of profit and undermined the production
of surplus value. In reaction to this the present Government is
attempting to alter the class balance of forces to raise the rate of
exploitation, but in so doing it will worsen in the short-term the
domestic conditions for realising this surplus value. That is, a
deflationary policy results in excess capacity and falling profit margins
(unless exports can rise to make up the loss, a scenario that looks
increasingly unlikely). In short, higher government spending
facilitates the realisation of profits in the short term, but interferes
with their production of profits in the longer term whereas cuts in
spending may aid the production of profits in the longer term, but at
their short-term expense. The conclusion is that an approach relying
on market forces to expand accumulation in the longer-term worsens
its prospects on the short to medium term.
Reproduction
2. Reproduction. The new conservatism believes that the welfare
state, the state organisation of social reproduction, has proceeded too
far, that individual and family responsibility are undermined by this
7D Purdy, 'British capitalism since the war', Marxism Today, Sept 1976.
M Jacques, Thatcherism: the impasse broken?', Marxism Today, Oct 1979.
8
 G Hodgson, Socialist Economic Strategy, ILP Square One Publications, 1979.
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process and need to be restored. But to what extent can this twentieth
century process be put into reverse? In my view the problems
generated by a substantial dismantling of welfare services would be
great, a fact reflected in the hesitancy even of this Government in
implementing spending cuts in, for example, the health service. First,
it would throw a greater burden back on individual families and in
particular the women within them. (Moroney9 documents the
enormous burden borne by, for example, middle-aged women in
caring for their elderly relatives.) But rising numbers of conventional
nuclear families are breaking up in divorse and a growing proportion
of them are not being reconstituted. The numbers of children living
with single parents is increasing, adding to the demand for, for
instance, supplementary benefit. Furthermore the women's
movement is now a force capable of resisting some of the more overt
The Thatcher government alone has
received Milton Friedman's blessing.
attempts at a 'back to the family' approach, as its recent success in
deflecting attempts to retract the abortion laws testifies. Second,
social needs are not something objectively identifiable; they are
interpreted and new needs engendered in the process of class and
social conflict. Community-based movements such as Womens Aid or
law centres have helped recognise and define previously personal
problems as new social needs. So too have state social services, as
when the introduction of the NHS in 1948 revealed a large unmet
need for medical services. These discoveries are not easily unlearnt
and the gains in social provision not easily reversed.
Thatcherism, in attacking the Keynesian-welfare state couplet,
thus risks regenerating many of the problems these policies were
initially designed to overcome; mass unemployment, renewed
poverty ^particularly amongst children), uneven regional develop-
ment and urban decay amongst others. But it will be attempting to
reverse a process that has generated an entirely different environment
to that of the thirties. Two factors have changed: expectations for
social provision now exist amongst a majority of the population; and
new movements exist, premised on the welfare state, to extend and
defend existing social and community provision.
A hazardous operation
3. Legitimation I repression. The present Government seeks legitimacy
for its policies in the ideologies of economic realism and authoritarian
populism, but these may prove to be a fragile basis, for several
reasons. First the purely electoral consequences are hazardous
because, as we noted above, the immediate impact of the policies is to
worsen recession and unemployment and to lower real incomes. Some
monetarists appreciate that the long time-span of their policies
conflicts with the election cycle of liberal democracies, and either
bemoan the constraints this imposes on 'sound' government policies
(something missing after all in the Chilean monetarist experiment) or
conduct a vigorous ideological offensive to convince the electorate
that theirs is the only sure way forward. But pressure is building up on
the Thatcher government from within the Conservative Party to
moderate its monetarist zeal, if not yet to undertake a U-turn. Second,
one fifth of the labour force is employed by central and local
government and has a direct interest in maintaining the level of public
expenditure and employment. Furthermore a majority of the
population are consumers in one way or another of social services and
many will resent falling standards in their particular sector, even if
supporting the Government's broad objectives. Third, fears are
growing (witness the post-mortems held on the Bristol riot) about the
threats to law and order and the growth of widening social divisions
and conflict which present social policies will exacerbate. Growing
numbers of unemployed school leavers, or the ghettoisation of the
council house estates remaining after the sale of the better local
authority housing, are two examples of the political dangers in
dismantling socially-provided services too far. It is true that the
Government is developing a more repressive strategy in some areas of
the welfare services and in its law and order policies generally, but the
harm to its legitimacy should not be underestimated particularly if
major opposition to its policies develops amongst those most affected
by them. Lastly, the attempt by the Thatcher government de-
liberately to depoliticise areas of social life by disclaiming government
responsibility and returning them to the anonymity of the market may
itself be politically unacceptable. After several decades in which the
state has accepted responsibility for the rate of unemployment, it is
hazardous for it now to claim that it has been powerless all along.
TOWARDS A LEFT ALTERNATIVE
I have tried to suggest some of the problems which Thatcherism is
likely to encounter in the near future. In the process I am conscious
that I have underplayed many of the strengths of Thatcherism as a
political movement recently emphasised by Hall and Leonard: the
contradictions inherent in the traditional social democracy of the
Labour Party; the popular appeal of anti-collectivist anti-state
sentiments given the experience of the state (including its welfare
apparatus) as a bureaucratic, oppressive imposition; the ability to tap
resentment against what Hall labels the '1968' movement for greater
democracy and personal freedom. But to list these resources of the
new conservatism is not to demonstrate that they will necessarily
succeed as a political movement.
However a clear message emerges from the above: the future
prospects of the conservative Right depend in great part on the
alternatives offered by the Left. Given the bankruptcy of Keynesian/
welfare state reformism, the choice offered by the Right is between a
step back towards the new conservatism or a further step forward in
state interventionism along right corporatist or centralist lines. It is
important to recognise that there is nothing inherently socialist in
further state intervention and that either option will threaten some of
the political and social rights established since the war. It is also
important in opposing both strategies to recognise the contradictory
the future prospects of the conservative
Right depend in great part on the
alternatives offered by the Left.
nature of the contemporary welfare state: it signals a collective
responsibility for meeting an array of social problems and social needs
certainly, but it achieves this through a process of centralisation in
which social policies are deformed and adapted to suit the
requirements of capital and to minimise democratic control.
The need is to move beyond the traditional politics of the Labour
Party by harnessing the Labour movement to the social, community,
women's and other democratic movements that have partly developed
in and against the welfare state. But secondly to combine this with an
alternative economic strategy to be implemented by a future left
government at the national level. An urgent task in both respects is to
develop a parallel alternative social strategy, that will propose new
priorities for social policy together with new forms of implementing
and controlling it. Insofar as this is not achieved, the Thatcherist
strategy, despite its problems outlined above, could win by default. D
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